Facts: Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at No. 13 Isidro St., Skyline Village. Catalunan Grande, Davao City. When petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System sometime in June, 1988, he and his family transferred to 130 K-8th St., East Kamias, Quezon City, where they are presently residing. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to two (2) houseboys, Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. The Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soguilon for the salary of the said houseboys and other expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soguilon to give her access in case of an emergency. Hence, since 1988, the key to the master's bedroom as well as the keys to the children's rooms were retained by herein Petitioners so that neither Edna Soguilon nor the caretakers could enter the house.
Police Officers had an information that the petitioner’s residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. Petitioner Ma. Luisa was contacted by telephone in her Quezon City residence by Capt. Obrero to ask permission to search the house in Davao City as it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the search but relented if the search would not be conducted in the presence of Major Ernesto Macasaet, an officer of the PC/INP, Davao City and a long time family friend of the Veroys.
The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the house of herein petitioners in Skyline Village to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by petitioner Ma. Luisa Veroy. The caretakers facilitated their entry into the yard, and using the key entrusted to Edna Soguilon, they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen. However, a locksmith by the name of George Badiang had to be employed to open the padlock of the door leading to the children's room. Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet then entered the children's room and conducted the search. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing seven (7) live bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer. Three (3) half-full jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the children's room. A search of the children's recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted polo shirts, men's brief, two (2) pieces polo barong and short sleeve striped gray polo. sweat shirt, two (2) pairs men's socks, a towel made in U.S.A., one blanket, a small black bag, Gandhi brand, containing a book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom. Sgt. Leo Justalero was instructed by Capt. Obrero to make an inventory and receipt of the articles seized, in the house.
The case was referred for preliminary investigation to Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor Rodolfo Ponferrada who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City. In a resolution dated August 6, 1990, Fiscal Ponferrada recommended the filing of an information against herein petitioners for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion). No bail was recommended.
Issue: Whether or Not Presidential Decree No. 1866, or at least the third paragraph of Section 1 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Held: The issue of constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been laid to rest in the case of Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990 (181 SCRA 648), where this Court held that the declaration of unconstitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is wanting in legal basis since it is neither a bill of attainder nor does it provide a possibility of a double jeopardy.
Petitioners' contention that Republic Act 6968 has repealed Presidential Decree No. 1866 is bereft of merit. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. Petitioners contend that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 is couched in general or vague terms. The terms "deal in", "acquire", "dispose" or "possess" are capable of various interpretations such that there is no definiteness as to whether or not the definition includes "constructive possession" or how the concept of constructive possession should be applied. Petitioners were not found in actual possession of the firearm and ammunitions. They were in Quezon City while the prohibited articles were found in Davao City. Yet they were being charged under Presidential Decree No. 1866 upon the sole circumstance that the house wherein the items were found belongs to them.
Petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Petitioners aver that while they concede that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break open the door of their residence, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 [193 SCRA 122]).
None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. The reason for searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not.
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. (Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 689-690 [1986]). Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition as granted and the criminal case against the petitioners for illegal possession of firearms is DISMISSED.
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