OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. JUDGE MARCELINO L. SAYO JR A.M. NOS. RTJ-00-1587. MAY 7, 2002

Facts: This administrative case were commenced by two letters of complaint addressed to the Chief Justice. In those letters, Judge Marcelino L. Sayo Jr. of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 45, was charged with gross misconduct, incompetence, corrupt practices, immorality, undue delay in rendering a decision, making untruthful statements in his Certificates of Service, and habitual tardiness.

The first letter, dated November 19, 1999, was signed and sworn to by Bella Balaguer-Fabro, court interpreter in respondent’s sala who was forced by the judge to leave for whimsical and capricious reasons

The second letter, dated November 23, 1999, was authored by Juanito Roxas, court legal researcher; Eufracio B. Pilipiña, sheriff IV; Merlita M. Decena, court stenographer III; Lina Norma S. Galicinao, court stenographer III; and Christine Salvador, clerk III who complained that the very short period since the appointment of respondent judge, five employees in the said branch were either detailed or transferred to another branch or office without any apparent reason.

On October 29, 1999, the Chief Justice received a similar letter from a “concerned employee” of Branch 45 alleging gross incompetence of Judge Sayo, as demonstrated by his failure to decide cases way beyond the prescribed period and his habitual tardiness (almost past 10:00 a.m.) in coming to court.


Issue: Whether or not the judge is liable for his acts.


Held: The Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to dispose of the court’s business promptly by deciding cases and matters within the required period of ninety (90) days from the date of their submission for decision, as mandated by the Constitution.

Judges should act with dispatch in resolving pending incidents, so as not to frustrate and delay the satisfaction of a judgment. Their inaction or procrastination to act one way or another gives room for suspicion that they are biased. As dispensers of justice, they should act in such a manner as to avoid suspicion, so that faith in the administration of justice may be preserved. Delay in resolving motions and incidents within the reglementary period of 90 days fixed by the Constitution and the law cannot be excused or condoned.

Likewise, respondent cannot use the alleged inefficiency and antagonistic attitude of his staff towards him as a defense. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, as well as to observe high standards of public service and fidelity at all times. The inability of respondent to control and discipline his staff demonstrates his weakness in administrative supervision, an undesirable trait frowned upon by this Court.

MELISSA DOMONDON ET. AL. VS. JUDGE PERCIVAL MANDAP LOPEZ A.M. NO. RTJ-02-1696. JUNE 20, 2002

Facts: This case against respondent judge arose from a case filed by complainants who were all students of AMA College. Said students were members of the editorial board of the school’s official publication who were expelled from the school for alleged libelous and scandalous writings in a spoof paper they published.

Complainants filed a case for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against AMA Computer College and Mauricia Herrera, Dean of Student Affairs. Complainants pressed their request for the immediate resolution of their application for preliminary mandatory injunction before the end of the enrollment period so that they can enroll in the first trimester of SY 1997-1998. They alleged that respondent judge failed to resolve their application for mandatory injunction on time to the prejudice of the complainants. Respondent countered however that there was no provision in law providing for a timeframe in resolving such application. On June 14, 1997, on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, respondent judge dismissed the case itself after finding that the expulsion of the complainants from the school was for cause and was effected only after an investigation during which they were duly heard.


Issue: Whether or not the judge is liable for the delay.


Held: Yes. Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to “dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods”.

Judge Lopez cannot invoke the absence of any provision prescribing a period within which to resolve an application for a writ of injunction. He should have been guided by the exigencies of the situation. He knew that complainants were seeking the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction precisely because they wanted to be readmitted by the college and for them to be able to enroll in the first trimester of school year 1997-1998.

It is also undisputed that no trial was ever conducted by respondent judge before dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. Respondent judge could not do this since there were issues of facts which had to be resolved.

GONZALES – DECANO VS. SIAPNO 353 SCRA 269

FACTS: Judge Alicia Gonzales – Decano, Executive Judge, RTC Urdaneta, Pangasinan, reported to the OCA the failure of Judge Siapno to decide numerous cases within the required periods dspite having been submitted for decision. Respondent judge justified is failures averring that his staff failed to transmit to him the stenographic notes of the proceedings to which he can rely on his decisions including the typed text of his decision for his signature. He also averred that his failure to render a decision in some cases were due to his appointments by the same Exec.Judge to numerous courts in Pangasinan.


ISSUE: Were the excuses of respondent judge sufficient to escape administrative sanctions?


HELD: No. Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Judges are charged with the administrative responsibility of organizing and supervising the court personnel to secure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business. Also, additional assignments or designations imposed upon a judge do not make him less liable for the delay in deciding cases.

CRUZ, JR. VS. JOVEN 350 SCRA 70 [2001]

FACTS: Atty. Cruz filed an administrative complaint against Judge Joven for gross negligence, abuse of authority, dereliction of duty and failure to render decision within 30 days as so prescribed by the Rules on Summary Procedure in an ejectment case then pending before him despite default on the part of the defendant and proper motion from the plaintiff. The failure to decide within the said period was due to the orders of respondent inhibiting himself from the case on the ground that an administrative complaint against him filed by the defendant was then pending. Judge Joven justified his orders as to “assure the parties of the impartiality and cold neutrality of a judge”.


ISSUE: Whether Judge Joven’s orders of inhibition proper.


HELD: No. Mere filing of an administrative case against a judge is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing the case. In the evolvement of the public perception on the judiciary, there can likely be no greater empirical data that influences it than the prompt and proper disposition of cases before the courts.

SINNOT VS. Judge BARTE A.M. No. RTJ – 99 – 1453; DECEMBER 14, 2001.

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint filed against Judge Recaredo P. Barte, of RTC Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 29 for bias and partiality for the acquittal of Nenito Gadonan, the accused in a double murder case in the sala of respondent.

Respondent does not deny the fact that he has an illicit relationship woth the daughter of the accused, Richel Gadonan, a woman not his wife.

Noticeably, complainants did not take any action to inhibit respondent from the case at the time of the trial. It was only when they learned about the special relationship of respondent Judge and a daughter of the accused after the trial of the criminal cases that they speculated on the partiality of respondent. Hence they filed this administrative case asking that the criminal cases before the RTC, Zamboanga del Sur should again be tried because the presiding judge, herein respondent, was biased and partial in favor of the accused.


ISSUE: Whether or not a judge’s illicit relationship with the daughter of the accused sufficient to reverse his judgment of acquittal in an administrative case.


HELD: No. In an administrative case, the court can only pass upon the administrative liability of the respondent. It cannot be a substitute for other judicial remedies available to the complainant, such as a Motion for Reconsideration or a Special Civil Action for Certiorari.

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his official duties and in his everyday life. Respondent’s intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife shows his moral indifference to the opinion of a good and respectable member of the community.

BALDERAMA VS. ALAGAR January 18, 2002

FACTS: Spouses Edmundo and Carmelita Balderama filed a letter-complaint against respondent Judge Adolfo Alagar of the RTC, San Fernando City, La Union with the Office of the Court administrator for partiality and bias and impropriety.

It appears that the spouses are the accused in a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public documents pending before Judge Alagar. Complaints charged Judge Alagar for impropriety as he was seen fraternizing with private complaints in the criminal case, spouses Jamie and Bernerda Ader. They thus filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Alagar which was denied.
Judge Alagar on the other hand explained that it was his driver who drove the judge’s car, who offered, on at least 2 occasions, the spouses Ader a ride to the court wherein they had a hearing before the sala of respondent judge. Judge Alagar further explained that he was not personally aware of what his driver did and only found out later upon investigation.


ISSUE: Whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent Judge transgressed the high standard of moral ethics mandated of magistrates by allowing himself to be seen at the residence of the private complainants.


HELD: Yes. What has not been clearly proven, however, was whether or not Judge Alagar had knowledge of his driver’s actuations, and also whether or not he ever personally went to the spouses Ader’s residence or fetched them for a hearing anytime. Notwithstanding this lack of direct proof of fraternizing with the party litigants in a case pending before his sala, this court holds that Judge Alagar should have nonetheless have exercised a greater degree of diligence in the supervision of his driver.

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should avoid not only actual acts of impropriety, but equally also the appearance thereof in all his activities, whether inside or outside the courtroom. A judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety; and his personal behavior, not only in the bench and in the performance of official duties, but also in his everyday life should be beyond reproach.

GERRY JAUCIAN VS. JUDGE SALVACION B. ESPINAS A.M. NO. RTJ-01-1641. MAY 9, 2002

Facts: Complainant, as losing mayoral candidate for the Municipality of Daraga, Albay, in the May 11, 1998 local elections, filed a petition, dated May 22, 1998, denominated as an ‘election protest and/or revision/recounting of votes,’ on the ground that fraud and anomalies were allegedly committed during the aforesaid local elections, both in the course of voting and during the counting and tabulation of the ballots, to his prejudice. He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the revision or recounting of the ballots in the contested 114 precincts as enumerated in his petition, the nullification and setting aside of the proclamation of Wilson Andes as mayor, and his own proclamation as mayor.

Respondent judge, despite being apprised of the relevant law, consistently and unjustly refused to order a recount of all of the contested boxes and ballots. Respondent judge based her order on a repealed law.


Issue: Whether or not the judge should be made liable for the erroneous decision.


Held: Yes. Indeed, as models of competence, integrity and independence, judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. To be able to render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the legal system, they are expected to keep abreast of all laws, legal principles and prevailing jurisprudence and to remain conversant with them. Everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence requires no less. Ignorance of the law excuses no one -- least of all, a judge.

Thus, judges may be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law when it is shown that -- motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption -- they ignored, contradicted or failed to apply settled law and jurisprudence.

MONTEROLA VS. Judge CAOIBES Jr. March 18, 2002.

FACTS: Respondent Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., promulgated a decision in favor of herein complainants Spouses Adriano and Hilda Monterola in a civil case. Due to said decision, the spouse filed a Motion for Execution, since the defendant Spouses Mario & Mavis Delagado did not appeal the decision and the period of appeal had already lapsed.

Judge Caoibes, however, refused to grant the motion for the issuance of the Writ of Execution.

In his comment, respondent judge denied the allegations in the complaint. He made it clear that he would issue the order for the issuance of the Writ of Execution but there was a necessity to determine first the exact amount due the complainants. According to him, this delay could not be considered as dereliction of duty because it was basically due to the sudden resignation of his personnel which gave rise to confusion that affected the disposition of pending matters. Additionally, the Motion for Execution filed by the complainants was a pro forma motion for failing to comply with the requirements of sec.5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as it lacked notice of hearing, and proof of service.


ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge’s refusal to issue a Writ of Execution was an act unbecoming of a judge.


HELD: Yes. There is no dispute that the decision of respondent had already become final & executory. Execution of the said decision should have issued as a matter of right, in accordance with sec. 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

In failing to issue the Writ of Execution in compliance with the clear mandate of the said rule, respondent either deliberately disregarded the rule or demonstrated ignorance thereof. His justification for his admitted delay in the issuance of the writ, namely, pro forma character of the motion for execution, necessity to determine the exact amount and confusion of court records due to the resignation of his key staff are very flimsy. In attempting to hide his ignorance by anchoring his “inaction” on other provisions of the Rules of Court, respondent all the more manifest a lack of familiarity on the harmonious interplay of the provisions of procedural law.

While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgments, it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with fundamental and basic legal principles in order to merit the confidence of the citizenry.

ESPINO VS. SALUBRE 352 SCRA 669 [2001]

FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Salubre for gross ignorance of law for issuing a warrant of arrest against Melvin Espino despite having lost jurisdiction over the case by forwarding the records of the preliminary investigation he earlier conducted to the Prosecutor and information was filed accordingly with the RTC. Judge Salubre averred that on the basis of the “Supplemental Sworn Statement” executed by the private complainant, he had the duty to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation and since it was demanded by the results of his inquiry, he issued the corresponding warrant of arrest.


ISSUE: Whether Judge Salubre is guilty of gross ignorance of law.


HELD: Yes. As a judge, he is presumed to know the law. And when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of law. It is a basic rule that once information is filed in the RTC, it is that court which must issue a warrant of arrest against the accused in a criminal case pending before it. Generally however, to constitute gross ignorance of law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and corruption. Although these circumstances were not all attendant in the case at bar, the fact still remains that respondent judge is ignorant of the basic rule in issuing warrants of arrest. For lack of bad faith, he was merely fined.

RASMIA U. TABAO VS. ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE ACMAD T. BARATAMAN A.M. NO. MTJ-01-1384. APRIL 11, 2002

Facts: Respondent judge granted bail to the accused who appears to remain at large when the motion to grant the same was filed by the accused’s father.

Complainant avers that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for bail on recognizance because (1) it was filed not by the accused but by his father, Hadji Yusoph Tabao; (2) the prosecutor was not furnished a copy of the motion and there was no hearing conducted; (3) it lacked the sworn statement of the accused signed in the presence of two witnesses; and (4) the motion and its supporting affidavit were signed by the father of the accused. Complainant also contends that the accused is not poor but is a certified public accountant and operates a transport business in Metro Manila. Thus, it is urged that he should not have been released on recognizance since he could put up a cash bond.


Issue: Whether or not the judge erred in granting bail to the accused.


Held: Yes. In the case at bar, respondent judge was fully cognizant that the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused who was still at large and yet, he entertained and granted his motion for bail. In doing so, respondent judge violated a tenet in criminal procedure which is too basic as to constitute gross ignorance of the law. When the law violated is elementary, a judge is subject to disciplinary action.

ATTY. DANIEL O. OSUMO VS. JUDGE RODOLFO M. SERRANO A.M. NO. RTJ-00-1607. APRIL 3, 2002

Facts: A complaint was filed against respondent judge in connection with a criminal case for Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder pending in his sala. Complainant is the private prosecutor in the above-mentioned criminal case. He alleged that respondent judge, after denying the accused’s demurrer to evidence without prior leave of court, set the continuation of the hearing for the reception of defense evidence, in disregard of Rule 119, Section 15 of the Rules of Court. Complainant contends that the demurrer to evidence without prior leave of court amounted to a waiver of the right to present evidence upon denial thereof. Thus, the prosecution filed a motion to submit the case for judgment, which was however denied. Moreover, respondent judge failed to resolve the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence.

Respondent judge filed his Comment, arguing that while a demurrer to evidence without prior leave of court amounted to a waiver of the right to present evidence, the accused in Criminal Case No. 2693 was charged with the heinous crime of Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder. Hence, procedural rules should not prevail over the right of the accused to be heard.


Issue: Is the judge liable for gross ignorance of law?


Held: Yes. Observance of the law which he is bound to know and swore to uphold is required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

The filing of the demurrer to evidence without leave of court and its subsequent denial results in the submission of the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence on record. Considering that the governing rules on demurrer to evidence is a fundamental component of criminal procedure, respondent judge had the obligation to observe the same, regardless of the gravity of the offense charged. It is not for him to grant concessions to the accused who failed to obtain prior leave of court. The rule is clear that upon the denial of the demurrer to evidence in this case, the accused, who failed to ask for leave of court, shall waive the right to present evidence in his behalf.

ANGELITA C. ORCINO vs. ATTY. GASPAR A.C. No. 3773 , September 24, 1997

Facts: Orcino engaged the services of Atty. Gaspar to prosecute a criminal case she intended to file against several suspects in the slaying of her husband. Complainant paid respondent his fees as stipulated. Forthwith, respondent entered into his duties and performed them religiously from the preliminary investigation with the office of the prosecutor until the case was thereafter filed with the RTC of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.

Respondent however failed to attend the bail hearing scheduled in August 1991. It was at this nearing that the court, over complainant's objections, granted bail to all the accused. After the hearing, complainant immediately went to respondent's residence and confronted him with his absence. Respondent explained that he did not receive formal notice of the hearing. Complainant became belligerent and started accusing him of jeopardizing the case by his absence. Respondent said that her suspicions were based on rumors and intrigues fed to her by her relatives. Complainant, however, continued accusing him belligerently. She asked for the records of the case saying that she could refer them to another lawyer. Stung by her words, respondent gave her the records.

Subsequently, respondent filed before the trial court a "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel" but it did not bear the consent of complainant. The court issued an order directing respondent to secure complainant's consent to the motion "and his appearance as private prosecutor shall continue until he has secured this consent." Complainant refused to sign her conformity to respondent's withdrawal. Meanwhile, the hearings in the criminal case continued. Respondent did not appear at the hearings nor did he contact complainant. Complainant was thus compelled to engage the services of another lawyer. Hence, this complaint.


Issue: Whether or not a lawyer is excused from his duty to represent his client if said client refuses to give his consent to the lawyer’s motion to withdraw his appearance.


Held: No. A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in court and copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine whether he ought to be allowed to retire. The application for withdrawal must be based on a good cause. In the instant case, respondent did not file an application with the court for it to determine whether he should be allowed to withdraw.


Corollary Issue: Granting that the Motion to withdraw appearance filed by respondent is sufficient as to form, is it based upon a good cause?

No. Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: ”A lawyer may withdraw his services from his client only in the following instances: (a) when a client insists upon an unjust or immoral conduct of his case; (b) when the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (c) when the client has two or more retained lawyers and the lawyers could not get along to the detriment of the case; (d) when the mental or physical condition of the lawyer makes him incapable of handling the case effectively; (e) when the client deliberately fails to pay the attorney's fees agreed upon; (f) when the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; (g) other similar cases”.

Respondent's withdrawal was made on the ground that "there no longer exist[ed] the . . . confidence" between them and that there had been "serious differences between them relating to the manner of private prosecution." This circumstance is neither one of the foregoing instances nor can it be said that it is analogous thereof.

DBP VS. CA 302 SCRA 362

FACTS: The DBP filed with the office of the sheriff of Malolos an application for extra-judicial foreclosure of real and personal properties involving several real and or chattel mortgage executed by the Continental Cement Corporation (CCC). The CCC filed a complaint with the RTC to principally sought to enjoin the DPB and sheriff of Malolos, Bulacan from commencing the foreclosure proceedings on CCC’s mortgage. A hearing was scheduled for the sole purpose of examining three of CCC’s witnesses but their counsels were not present. Counsels justified their absence due to the failure of the former counsel to turn over the records of the case despite several demands.


ISSUE: Whether or not the absences of counsels are justified under the circumstances.


HELD: No. The withdrawal of previous counsel in the thick of the proceedings would be a reasonable ground to seek postponement of the hearing. However, such reason necessitates a duty and obligation, on the part of the new counsel to prepare himself for the next scheduled hearing. The excuse that it was due to the former counsel’s failure to turn over the records of the case shows the negligence of the new counsel to actively recover the records of the case. More demands are not sufficient. Counsel should have taken adequate steps to fully protect the interest of his client, rather than pass the blame on the previous counsel. A new counsel who appears in a case in midstream is presumed obliged to acquaint himself with all the antecedent process and proceedings that have transferred prior to his takeover.

EMILIANO COURT TOWNHOUSES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION VS. Atty. MICHAEL DIONEDA ADM. CASE No. 5162; MARCH 20, 2003.

FACTS: In 1997, complainant ETCHA and respondent entered into a Retainer’s Agreement wherein respondent lawyer agreed to handle the case of the complainant against LVF Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family Savings Bank by way of filing a complaint – in – intervention. ETCHA alleged that after respondent received the amount of Php 20, 000, he did nothing for the development of the case and to update the complaint-in-intervention.

ETCHA then demanded the return of the amount received by respondent since he did nothing to protect the interest of the complainant. Respondent promised to return the amount but after deducting therefrom a reasonable fee for the efforts exerted by him. He averred that the agreement also included an earlier case with the HLURB where he was able to obtain a favorable judgment for the complainant.

It appears however that respondent, for one reason or another, failed to attend any hearing with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline tasked to hear this administrative complaint.


ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is entitled to compensation based on the Retainer’s Agreement? If not, is he entitled to compensation based on quantum meruit?


HELD: He is not entitled to compensation neither based on the Retainer’s Agreement nor on quantum meruit.

Generally, a valid written agreement fixing attorney’s fees is conclusive as between the parties. And when both parties are deemed to have impliedly repudiated the contract and placed themselves in the position as though there was no express stipulation as to the attorney’s fees, the lawyer’s compensation shall be determined on the basis of quantum meruit. Here, the Supreme Court considered the demand of ETCHA for the refund of the entire amount received as attorney’s fees and the counter – proposal of respondent to deduct reasonable fees for the efforts exerted by him as implied repudiation of the contract by both parties.

However, to deserve compensation based on quantum meruit the lawyer must prove by substantial evidence that he is entitled to a reasonable fee for his efforts in pursuing his client’s case with the court taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of his fees. It is noteworthy to point out respondent’s failure to attend any hearing of his disbarment case before the IBP without presenting any reason. Respondent’s lamentable attitude towards his client’s case is clearly evident from his apparent disinterest in his own case for disbarment. Therefore, for having missed the opportunities to present evidence in his favor without any satisfactory explanation as to his non-appearance, he should be denied compensation based on quantum meruit due to the lack of any factual basis to determine the value of his work as complainant’s counsel.

ONG VS. UNTO February 6, 2002

FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by Alex Ong against Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, for malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.

It is evident from the records that he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-demand by threatening to file various charges against the latter. When the complainant did not heed his warning, he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the complainant. They, however, did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client,

The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him any information against the complainant just so he would have leverage in his actions against the latter.



ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Unto’s acts constitute malpractice.


HELD: Yes. Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate, or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

PEOPLE VS. SEVILLENO 305 SCRA 519

FACTS: The accused was charged with the crime of rape with homicide committed against a 9 year old minor. He entered the plea of guilty for the crime charged. When the prosecution rested its case, Atty. Saldavia of the PAO appointed as counsel de oficio for the accused manifested that since his client had already pleaded guilty he would no longer present any evidence. He only invoked the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty.


ISSUE: Whether or not the counsel de officio of the accused acted properly as defense counsel.


HELD: No. Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matters entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable. In the instant case, the defense lawyer did not protect, much less uphold the fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly performed their function as counsel de officio to the detriment and prejudice of the accused.

REONTOY VS. IBADLIT A.C. CBD No. 190 Feb. 4, 1999 302 SCRA 604

FACTS: An adverse decision was rendered by the trial court against the client of Atty. Ibadlit. He did not appeal the decision because of his opinion that to appeal would be futile. An administrative complaint was later filed by Atty. Ibadlit’s client against him for failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period.


ISSUE: Whether a lawyer may refuse to file an appeal on behalf of his client when in his opinion to make an appeal would be futile.


HELD: No. It was highly improper for him to have adopted such opinion since a lawyer is without authority to waive his client’s right to appeal and his failure to appeal within the prescribed period constituted negligence and malpractice. Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 0f the CPR “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.”

DOMINADOR P. BURBE VS. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA AC NO. 99-634. JUNE 10, 2002

Facts: Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not successful and so the former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the case.

A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the prosecutor’s office while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent that day.

Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of court to see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed.

Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively.


Issue: Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.


Held: Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP as follows: “It is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.”

LOLITA ARTEZUELA VS. ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO A.C. NO. 4354. APRIL 22, 2002

Facts: Artezuela filed before the Supreme Court a verified complaint for disbarment against the respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly neglected his duties her lawyer in a damage suit and failed to represent her interests with zeal and enthusiasm. According to her, when her case was scheduled for pre-trial conference, respondent asked for its postponement although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding complainant’s persistent and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do anything to keep the case moving. He withdrew as counsel without obtaining complainant’s consent.

Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests. While acting as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavia’s Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said document was even printed in respondent’s office. Complainant further averred that it was respondent who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with her consent.


Issue: Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.


Held: Yes. He is guilty of representing conflicting interests prohibited by Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse party’s conflicting interests of record--- although these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.

ERLINDA ABRAGAN ET.AL. VS. ATTY MAXIMO RODRIGUEZ A.C. NO. 4346. APRIL 3, 2002

Facts: Sometime in 1986, complainants hired the services of the respondent to represent in a case before the MTCC of Cagayan de Oro City. The case was won by the complainants. Subsequently, when the lawyer allegedly surreptitiously dealt with the subject property with other persons, the petitioner severed the lawyer – client relationship.

On August 1991, complainants filed a case of indirect contempt against Sheriff Fernando Loncion et al. Much to their surprise, respondent represented the sheriff. Since the counsel employed by the complainants was a former student of respondent, said counsel, egged by the suggestions of respondent withdrew the case without the petitioner’s consent. That as a result of such withdrawal, subsequent events occurred to the prejudice of the complainants.


Issue: Whether or not Atty. Rodriguez should be disbarred.


Held: Yes. In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that “a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.”