Facts: Wilfredo dela Torre, appellee, has three children from a common-law relationship, the eldest of which is Mary Rose. When Mary Rose was 7 yearsold, her mother left them together with her youngest brother so she and her other brother were left to the care of her father.
Mary Rose was the brightest in her class despite their poverty. However, in January 1997, a sudden change in Mary Rose’s behavior behavior was noticed. She was twelve years old at that time. She appeared sleepy, snobbish and she also urinated on her panty. When confronted by her head teacher, Mary Rose admitted that she was abused repeatedly by her father. Her father, however, denied vehemently the charges being imputed to him by her daughter.
The RTC convicted appellee of two counts of acts of lasciviousness and four counts of murder. However, the RTC refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained that there were circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the offenses such as the absence of any actual physical violence or intimidation on the commission of the acts, that after the mother of Mary Rose left the conjugal home, for more than five years, Wilfredo, Mary Rose and her brother were living together as a family and Mary Rose was never molested by her father.
The prosecution seeks to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of death of the accused. It argues that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and that she was below eighteen years old when the rapes took place. As a consequence, the trial court should have been imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. 7659.
Issue: Whether or Not the Court erred in penalizing the appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the four indictments of rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A. 7659.
Held: Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a judgment or final order unless the accused will be put in double jeopardy. In People vs. Leones, it declared that:
“while it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort, there are allegations of error committed by a lower court which we ought not to look into to uphold the right of the accused. Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution seeking to increase the penalty imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul of the right of the accused against double jeopardy…When the accused after conviction by the trial court did not appeal his decision, an appeal by the government seeking to increase the penalty imposed by the trial court places the accused in double jeopardy and should therefore be dismissed.”
The ban on double jeopardy primarily prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves as a deterrent from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.
Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the appeal of the prosecution cannot prosper.
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