PAULIN VS. GIMENEZ [217 SCRA 386; G.R. NO. 103323; 21 JAN 1993]

Facts: Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust when they were overtaken by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, Mabuyo followed the vehicle until the latter entered the gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby security guard for the identity of the owner of the vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his duties, petitioners allegedly pointed their guns at him. Thus, he immediately ordered his subordinate to call the police and block road to prevent the petitioners’ escape. Upon the arrival of the police, petitioners put their guns down and were immediately apprehended.

A complaint “grave threats” was filed against the petitioners (Criminal Case No. 5204). It was dismissed by the court acting on the motion of the petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the dismissal was reversed. Thereafter, petitioners filed for “certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief of preliminary injunction and the issuance of a TRO” (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading and ordered to proceed with the trial of the case. Hence, this instant petition.


Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of acquittal.

(2) Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioner’s right against double jeopardy by dismissing CEB-9207.


Held: For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused, he has deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach.

Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The latter is always based on merit that shows that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in the case at bar, terminated the proceedings because no finding was made as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.

The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of dismissal for the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to complete the presentation of its evidence. The rule on summary procedure was correctly applied.