People vs. Casido G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997

Facts: In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin applied for pardon before the Presidential Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission (NAC). The PCGBRP was constituted in line with the confidence-building measures of the government. Thereafter, accused-appellants were granted conditional pardon. But the Court ruled in resolution that the conditional pardon granted to accused-appellants is void for having been extended during the pendency of their appeal. Prior to the resolution, the NAC favorably acted on the applications for amnesty of accused-appellants.


Issue: Whether or not the release of accused-appellants is valid


Held: The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted them and not by the pardon.

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by the Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for which accused-appellants voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress.